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While Suharto was in power there was practically no one who accused 
him of corruptly using up the people's money. Were they to have done 
so, their fate was evident: it is certain they would end up in jail.
Haruskah (daripada) Soeharti diadili? [Must Suharto be brought to 
trial? Rather than that. . .  ?] Ummat, June 8,1998, p. 14.
The artless confession in this news magazine, speaking to and about the middle 
class, helps in understanding the course of events that led up to the resignation of 
President Suharto. By May 1998 Indonesia had shared in the economic difficulties of 
East Asia for ten months, and though a great many people were feeling its effects and 
there was much political discontent, no one seemed to have anticipated Suharto's 
resignation. After it took place, however, people in Jakarta, though initially surprised, 
thought it was easily explicable. Suharto left office after two violent incidents. 
Students, who had originally demonstrated against the rise in prices that accompanied 
the fall in value of the rupiah had begun to demand Reformasi (Reform), sometimes in 
effect taking up the vocabulary of the IMF when they asked for "transparency" which, 
for a while, was an important word of political rhetoric.1 Students at the private
1 "Transparency" of course was used to indicate the possibility of knowing the true state of financial 
institutions and also public access to awarding of contracts etc. It soon was used to describe the 
desirability of political events also being open to view. It had no antonym except perhaps in KKN, 
"Kolusi, korupsi, nepotism" (collusion, corruption and nepotism), it being assumed that what was hidden 
from view was corrupt and that corruption in the New Order took those three forms. The use of visual 
metaphors throughout the period deserves attention. Here I only note that the demands for "reform asi" 
were not demands for representation but insistence that the political system be open to view. It is truly
Indonesia 66 (October 1998)
76 James T. Siegel
Trisakti University in Jakarta, known by the term "mamas' children," because they 
often came from privileged families, had been late to join the demonstrations. 
However they too began protests. On May 12, in the course of a rally, four Trisakti 
students were shot dead, presumably by police who were then accused of using real 
rather than rubber bullets; soon after it was widely thought that elements from the 
army had done the shooting. In the afternoon of the next day, May 13, rioting broke 
out against Indonesian Chinese in many parts of Jakarta, continuing on May 14. The 
riots continued the following day. Students from Jakarta and elsewhere occupied the 
grounds and the roof of the National Assembly, the military mysteriously allowing 
them to so. On May 17, Harmoko, the speaker of the Assembly, a long-time servile 
follower of Suharto, called for his resignation. Subsequently fourteen of Suharto's 
ministers resigned, and he could not find people to serve on the new Reform 
Commission. A major demonstration was called off on May 20 when Amien Rais, the 
head of the Muslim organization Muhammadiyah, announced that a certain general, 
later rumored to be Lt. General Prabowo, the son-in-law of President Suharto, had said 
that it would lead to bloodshed. On May 21, President Suharto resigned. The train of 
events seemed to the many people with whom I spoke in June 1998 to be self-evident. 
But if so, it is because events which were at first surprising were set within the 
workings of Indonesian political discourse and made to seem natural.
The last years of the New Order saw political protest of various sorts. The strongest 
was no doubt the long struggle of the inhabitants of East Timor resisting their forced 
inclusion in Indonesia after the invasion of that former Portuguese colony in 1975. 
Student demands, however, made no mention of East Timor. Crowds gathered outside 
Cipinang Prison when President Habibie released the labor leader Mochtar Pakpahan 
and other political prisoners, but no student delegations were present.2 That the 
students failed to include the causes of labor or of the Timorese or of other groups, 
such as Aceh Merdeka, for instance, in their demands partly reflects their newness on 
the political scene. Their appearance was, in fact, so recent that one is hard put to say 
who their leaders were and what it is that they wanted. Interviewed after the National 
Assembly sit-in, one, a "supply coordinator" for the students occupying the National 
Assembly, formulated their demands this way: "[We want] to change the regime now
"reform " and not, of course, "revolution." Exposure, one can say, became a political idea first with 
"transparency" and then with rape.
2 So at least go the news reports of the event which sometimes list groups present to greet the released 
prisoners but make no mention of students. See for example, "Tapol/N apol: Bebas Semua atau Tidak?" 
D&R, June 6,1998, pp. 24-25; and see "Merdeka! Atau Bebas," Ummat, June 8,1998, p. 29, etc. Ummat is 
close to ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals), the group of Muslim leaders formed by 
Habibie when he was vice president. The newsweekly D&R is perhaps the most influential of the 
weeklies, meaning the most au courant of political gossip; it largely took the place of the banned weekly 
Tempo. Ummat is reformist Islamic in outlook.
I should point out that this piece concerns only Jakarta. In other areas, students united or tried to 
unite with other groups. Jakarta is, of course, the city where the middle class is most developed. Army 
policy was to keep students separated from other groups; in Jakarta it easily succeeded. There were youth 
groups in Jakarta who, during the late New Order, were interested in coalitions but their influence was 
not apparent during the events of May.
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in power for a new bureaucratic elite more favorable to the people."3 One notes the 
lack of space left for the seething masses.
The protesters' failure to offer much in the way of a political program, along with 
their failure to take up the demands of labor and regional groups, cannot simply be 
explained by the recent appearance of students on the political scene nor, as the 
magazine Ummat suggests, by the fact that until recently political protest meant jail. 
There were those such as Mochtar Pakpahan, or inhabitants of Timor Timur and Aceh, 
who made their demands felt knowing that they would be jailed or killed. If students 
did not act earlier it is because, despite occasional discontent, most of them tacitly 
supported a regime which did so much to establish the class to which they belonged. 
Only when the "krismon"(the acronym for "krisis moneter" or "monetary crisis" became 
acute, did they act. An explanation based on interests alone however will not entirely 
explain the inflections of political discourse in the aftermath of the events of May. 
These events brought up questions of the relations between classes and the place of 
race and sex in national identity.
Let us start with the students. President Habibie, the successor to President 
Suharto, proclaimed the four murdered Trisakti students "Heroes of Reform." They 
were, one journal said, "inscribed as makers of a new history."4 To be a hero of reform 
seems almost an oxymoron, reform being usually gradual and peaceful in contrast to 
revolution. If the predicate "hero" seemed appropriate for the victims, however, it was 
not only because they were shot dead, but also because the word implicitly referred to 
earlier moments when, during the revolution and again at the beginning of the New 
Order, youths moved events forward in violent circumstances. As usual in Indonesia, 
forward movement was put in terms of generations. Furthermore, students borrowed 
much of the iconography of the revolution. But these students were quite different 
from their nationalist forebears. Unlike in the 1930s, when parents of young 
nationalists were often thought to belong to a world of custom and hence were 
considered incapable of understanding their children, or during the revolution, when 
youth acted without much reference to parents, in May 1998 there was an 
understanding between parents and children (if not between generations as such, 
which is a wider political term). Parents of students and alumni of Jakartan universities 
brought the protesters provisions as they occupied the National Assembly. Students 
are reported to have acted with the consent of their parents, not merely sought their 
approval afterwards. The usual norms of familial behavior were still in force. The days 
of heroic reform were not a period of license but of normal relations between the sexes. 
Female students often continued to make themselves up on the grounds of the 
National Assembly—that is, to look at once attractive and proper—and there was the 
same sort of flirting that took place on the campuses.5 There was scarcely anything 
rebellious about their actions. In demanding Suharto's resignation, they were merely 
asking for what their parents too wanted. By comparison, the students who abducted
3 "Saya Kurang Ngerti Politik, tapi. . . "  [I don't understand politics, bu t . . .  ], Panji Masjarakat, June 10, 
1998, pp. 47ff. Panji Masjarakat is connected with the Muslim organization Muhammadiyah. This 
interesting article has much about die students' behavior during their occupation of the National 
Assembly grounds. Panji Masjarakat is an Islamic reformist journal of long standing.
4 Ibid.
5 Conversations with various students; also "Saya Kurang Ngerti Politik, tap i. . . ” pp. 47ff.
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Sukarno in order to make him proclaim national independence were ahead of their 
elders.
My interest is in the popular political assumptions of the middle class as they were 
refracted in explanations of the events. Before the burning and pillaging began, it was 
not only the middle class that was interested in a change of regime; the lower classes as 
well felt the pressure of the sudden regression of the economy. There was a high rate 
of unemployment while some of those still with jobs found their salaries inadequate to 
feed their children. Thus at the moment that the riots of May 13 and 14 began, a 
student, speaking for "the people" (rakyat), could assume that they, "the people," were 
behind him. Students, however, quickly refused an alliance with those on the street. In 
retrospect, it was widely thought that the actions of "massa," as such people were 
called, were instigated from above. But it took time for this opinion to be generated. 
The students' refusal of an alliance when one seemed possible had other causes as 
well.
Here is the experience of one student at Trisakti University where four student 
demonstrators were shot. It was reported in a woman's weekly.6 Alya Rohali is a 
television actress as well as a student.7 She went to the Trisakti campus, three 
kilometers from her house, on Wednesday, May 13, the day after the four students 
were shot and the day the riots broke out, in her own car. Various speeches, called by 
the term, scarcely used until recently, "orasi" in Indonesian were given by various 
" orator" (Indonesian) including Adnan Buyung Nasution, a famous lawyer and civil 
rights activist. Some students went on to the burial ceremonies for two of their slain 
comrades. Others stayed at the university. The latter were still on the university 
grounds when the riots broke out. The military had allowed demonstrations on the 
condition that they be confined to university campuses. In her statement Alya says that 
the people on the street asked the students to join them.
"I really remember how at the time some people wanted us to gather outside 
the campus. But we refused. Because of that they ["they" here refers to the 
rioters, referred to as massa meaning "mass" or "masses"] started to throw things 
toward the campus," related Alya. "Fortunately the massa actions didn't get any 
of us," she added.
Alya was worried when she saw that the atmosphere around the campus was 
tinged with the clash between the massa and the security apparatus. To control 
the brutal massa actions, the [security] apparatus, indeed, used tear gas.8
6 "Hadapi Gas Air Mata Pakai Softlens: Pengalaman Jadi Demonstran Trisaskti," Nyata, June 11,1998, p. 2.
7 Alya Rohali was involved in a controversy when, elected Miss Indonesia, she was attacked by certain 
Muslim groups for partipating in immoral activities, i.e., the beauty contest. She was also rumored to be a 
candidate for marriage with Tommy Suharto, the president's son, who, however, married someone else. 
The references to the "favorite" Cakra car, die car made by Tommy's company, probably allude to that 
piece of history.
8 1 am told by Benny Subianto that it is unusual for die Jakarta security forces to use tear gas. That they did 
so no doubt was an effect of the situation aroused by the killing of the students.
As we will see, it was unusual for die police to act at all on May 13. They were notable for their nearly 
complete absence. That they were present at Trisakti was no doubt because of the student killings and not 
in response to the street demonstrations. That die police acted against the people on the streets around 
Trisakti indicates that, if the security apparatus was in collusion with street demonstrators elsewhere, it 
was not the case there.
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Indeed, Alya panicked when she was hit by the gas. "In all my whole life, this 
was the first time I was hit by tear gas," Alya said. "Fortunately, I had on 
softlens," [italicized in original] she said with a smile.
The activist students, some of whom had come to Jakarta from various regions to 
participate in the political events, were shocked to see action begin on the street and 
were often quick to disown it. In this case, Alya was already afraid to join with the 
people who, at this point, had yet to begin the looting, arson, and rape which marked 
the next two days. So far as she was concerned, to go on to the street was to defy the 
army and acknowledge a common cause with people she mistrusted. "...On the street 
its difficult to know our friends from our enemies and hard also to anticipate people 
who slip in with different goals," she says. She is afraid of who she will be with. Those 
who "slip in with different goals" might perhaps be looters, out to get what they can, 
and thus, in her mind, they deviate from the ends of the students and are perhaps 
misled by other protesters with indistinct, but different, aims. Or more likely they 
could be elements from the army or police who hope to incite students to violence, 
thus setting the stage for violent reprisals. Both students and those on the street have 
political goals. In Alya's judgment, the differences are that her comrades, while not 
exactly on the side of the law, at least act with the understanding of military authorities 
who, for instance, allowed them into the grounds of the National Assembly and 
permitted them to demonstrate within the confines of their campuses. The other 
difference between her and the massa concerns property. She and her friends do not 
want what does not belong to them. The rioters' relation to goods was much more 
ambiguous. On the one hand, the general events were commonly said to involve 
"looting" (penjarahan); on the other hand, the agents of this activity were rarely said to 
"loot" (mmjarah) or to "steal" (cun), but were said merely to "take" (ambil) what they 
felt was theirs by a right whose nature we will ask about later. To anticipate for a 
moment, the difference comes when one chooses whether to think of these people as 
either “massa" or as " r a k y a t "the people" take out of need; the massa loot.
When they see the events on the street, Alya and her friends are afraid to stay on 
the campus and afraid also to leave. Finally, they climb the wall dividing their campus 
from that of a neighboring university, Tarumanegara, and from there enter the narrow 
side streets in back of campus, where it is calm. They are still afraid to enter the major 
avenues; they stay with a friend who lives nearby until, at nine in the evening, her 
father comes to get her. " 'I was relieved to have Papa meet m e/ said the girl bom in 
Jakarta December 1,1975.'"
Despite her fear, she goes out again the next day. The situation has calmed, and she 
goes back to the campus.
Alya rushed to get her favorite Cakra sedan and move it to her grandmother's 
house in Kampung Melayu, Jakarta Timur. It was a good thing Alya's car was 
safe from the brutal actions of the massa. [In fact, 1119 cars were reported 
burned.] "Boy, if it were burned I would have been really upset. The price of cars 
these days is out of sight and there are fewer and fewer jobs," she said with a 
smile.9
9 The number of cars burned is based on a figure from the National Commission on Human Rights as 
reported in Gatra, "Cerita Lain dari Kerusuhan" [Another Story from the Riots], June 13,1998, p. 37.
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The reporter adds that the events of May 13 and 14 were "terrifying" [menyeramkan] 
and "really shook her" [mertcekam]. Alya adds, "It was just like war. But I hope that 
nothing like that happens again. It really was terrifying. . . "  The reporter points out in 
the course of his article that Alya has had an experience which university students who 
want to be active demonstrators could keep in mind, particularly those who wear 
glasses for nearsightedness.
"During the demo on the campus, I was lucky to be wearing softlens. The tear gas 
could not get into my eyes. Its different from my friends; their eyes stung and 
watered. So my experience can be a lesson. Whoever wants to join a demo, wear 
softlens to protect against tear gas," said the student from the Law School in her 
eighth semester with a smile when she met Zulkamaen from Nyata.
She, like many other students, was not afraid of the police but was "terrified" of the 
massa. The police (it was rumored later to be the army) killed four of her fellow 
students. But Alya is perfectly safe from them; she wears softlens. Nothing the police do 
harms her. What protects her is a cosmetic device which she presumably wears in the 
attractive photo which accompanies the article. We clearly see, no matter what lens we 
are wearing at the moment, the division of her sentiments. Alya is for "Reformasi" and 
herself gives a speech advocating reform of the economy. She is for a change of 
government and says that she wants President Habibie to have the chance to prove 
himself. She thinks the army chief, General Wiranto, would be an excellent president. 
She is against corruption, upset about the way the government has been run, and 
concerned about the economy. But what "terrorizes" her is the “massa" who, in her 
own discourse, acted by themselves, without direction from above, as was widely 
reported later. One should keep in mind too that her statement was made before 
stories of rape began to circulate. She has seen two kinds of violence. One is the arson 
and looting of the "masses." The other, which she did not see herself but which 
affected her enough to bring her back to the university after the shooting, was the 
killing of four of her comrades by the police. Only one of these events "terrified" her; 
the first. The second moved her but left her perfectly safe. This division of sentiments 
was widespread if not universal and is so much a part of Jakartan assumptions that it 
seems to go unremarked.
The police shot her comrades but she fears "the massa" It is a question of the 
softlens. It is not that she sees better with it. Rather, protecting her from the tear gas the 
police used against the "massa," it renders her fearless of them. Perhaps it is the way 
she looks. Her contact lenses are an element in the construction of her appearance, like 
her Cakra sedan, that assure her she is recognized for what she is: a member of the 
class the police usually protect. If, exceptionally, they shot her comrades, it does not 
change her essential position either toward them or toward those of the lower classes 
who for a moment seemed to share her interests. Her political vision, at least, is safe 
with her softlens.
The Massa
The "massa," it is agreed, were "brutal" and worse. Who exactly were they? In the 
first stories of the riots that were widespread in Jakarta, the "massa" were largely 
represented as local people. In Glodok, the old "Chinese" section of the city, a major
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shopping center was burned and looted and at least seventy homes destroyed as the 
flames from the market spread. The five-story market, a center for. the sale of 
electronics, clothing, and so on, faced onto an older row of shops in front of which ran 
an arcade. On the sidewalk under the arcade, merchants, for the most part "pribumi," 
i.e., not "Chinese," sell various items. These merchants told us that when die massa 
approached, these small merchants, who knew them because they too were pribumi 
and because they too lived in the vicinity, told them to save these shops; to destroy 
them would mean that the livelihood of their neighbors also would be jeopardized. 
The shops were not touched.10 Across the street, a group of merchants standing in 
front of the bumed-out shopping center where they formerly traded repeated the same 
story. From Pantai Indah Kapok, a new housing complex located in Pluit in the north 
of the city and occupied largely by "Chinese," there came a similar story. Here sixty- 
four houses were binned out and over four hundred, which means most of them, were 
looted.11 People there told us that the looters were from the neighboring area, a part of 
the city crowded with series of shacks. The victims were furious; they felt betrayed by 
the police, the army, and the government who had failed to protect them and who, 
indeed, they were sure instigated the riots. Though to say "the government" instigated 
the riots would be too broad. Elements within the army, they were sure, had done it. 
"They came in trucks and some had on [military] boots." I heard this sentence more 
than once in just these words in several sections of the city. As in Glodok, we heard 
that before the local people arrived, others were already there, also arriving in trucks. 
In Glodok these early visitors had large crowbars they used to pry up the metal 
shutters of the shops. They then told the locals, mainly male youths, to help themselves 
to the goods. These military types then themselves spread gasoline and set the place 
afire. Of the about 1,100 people reported killed during the events of May 13 and 14, 
most of them are said to have been looters who died in these fires; but at the time of 
this writing, there seems to be no way to confirm how many actually died.
In East Jakarta, where again shopping centers were burned down, I was told by a 
friend that first people arrived in trucks, again wearing military boots. They set alight 
tires from whatever cars were nearby to attract locals. They then, he said, pried open 
the shop shutters, took out goods, and showed the locals that they could do the same. 
Then they left. My friend, a retired official of the Ministry of Religion, told me that 
local mosques used their loudspeakers to dissuade the looters from their work, but 
their efforts were only sometimes successful.
A secretary in her twenties told of leaving work at noon and crossing Jakarta to get 
home. There was only one bus running, and it went only part of the way. She walked 
for six hours before reaching home, by necessity often walking through looters at 
work. She remembered thinking as she watched them, "These are not human beings. 
They are animals." She heard the azan from the mosque chanting the call to prayer, 
without, in this case, any special message for the looters and thought, "W hat a 
contrast." She traversed a place where woman and children, among others, were 
carrying sacks of rice and cartons of Indo Mie (packaged noodles) out of a shop. 
Another woman said to them, "'What you are doing is shameful. Its not human." The
101 am indebted to Benny Subianto who accompanied me on this occasion.
11 This according to Sudamo Tasmin, "Chinese," a director of an insurance company and the 
neighborhood leader (kepala R.T.). I spoke with him on June 7,1998 accompanied by Henri Chambert-Loir.
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woman who was busy with her stolen cartons answered in one word: "Chinese." The 
first one persisted, arguing "Chinese" too were human. But to no avail.
The secretary, let us call her Rahmah, went on to say
Some people think the looting was maneuvered by someone or other, but I don't 
think so. At die big malls, maybe, but not at these small shops. The trouble is that 
for so long these people have seen on tv, on the news, in the soap operas, how 
much luxury some people have. Now with the economy the way it is, they have 
nothing. There is such a gap and they have been patient for so long.
These sentiments and even the phrases about the enticement of television, particularly 
the soap operas, which are often about wealthy families and about the "gap" between 
rich and poor, have for a long time been heard in the press and in the speech of 
Jakartans who consider themselves middle class.
Rahmah is typical in sympathizing with the plight of the rioters but condemning 
their rioting. The suffering of "the people" is a common theme in the middle-class 
press. Rahmah does not want to deny it; quite the contrary. But she sees the actions of 
the looters as "inhuman." One does not excuse the other. She simply does not put the 
two attitudes in conjunction with one another to arrive at a consolidated conclusion.
Rahmah's thinking is similar to that of Alya's, who on the one hand advocates 
reform of the economy to help "the people" [rakyat] and at the same time perceives the 
looters [massa], through her softlens, as the chief danger to her safety. The difference 
between these two women, perhaps, is that Rahmah, never having taken a political 
position, was not forced to decide between the security forces and the massa. I asked 
Rahmah if she was not afraid on her travels home. She said no, that she was with many 
others, all forced to pass through looters at work. She, like the woman who chided the 
rioters, did not feel that she herself was in danger. She was not worried, for instance, at 
being thought "Chinese." The only time she was frightened, she said, was when 
soldiers fired into the air as she passed a shopping mall. Then she like everyone else 
ran. When I told her, "then you were afraid of ABRI" [the abbreviation for the 
Indonesian Armed ForcesJ she was surprised to find it was the case. In my opinion, 
however, she was not afraid of ABRI at all; she was afraid of guns.
That this young woman felt safe walking among the rioters shows the depths of 
her identification with them. She understands very well their need, and she 
understands as well the attraction that the goods in these stores have for them. On the 
other hand, she finds their actions deplorable. I do not doubt the sincerity of her 
conviction on either score. To say that she understands them is to say not only that she 
sympathizes with them in their situation, but also that she feels, with them, the lure of 
the enormous wealth displayed on television. The difference between her and the 
looters is that she would not give in to this attraction. It is just here that a question of 
class arises. The massa are, as looters, uncivilized. Their looting is an indication of how 
much further they need to develop. She is as certain of what separates them from her 
as she is of what links them to her.
The Indonesian middle class is not merely wealthier than the underclass; it is 
almost comfortable with its wealth; it does not feel it will be devoured by it. The lower 
classes, by contrast, are often suspicious of the effects of ownership of wealth while 
still finding it attractive. Those who can refrain from taking easily available market
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goods merit the title "middle class." Those who cannot may or may not still live in a 
traditional ambiance; whether or not this is the case, in Indonesia today they are 
sometimes identified as the massa and sometimes "the people," and there's no need, as 
we have seen, to pin them with a definitive judgment. In Europe, conflict between 
classes shaped class identity; in Indonesia, by contrast, class is largely the result of 
undesired distinctions within the body of the nation. Conflict has not played a large 
part in developing class identities. Rather attitudes toward wealth are a central point of 
differentiation.
If Rahmah feels safe during riots, it is not only because of the complicated quality 
of her identification with "the people." It is also because she is certain that she is not 
"Chinese" and that she will not be taken for "Chinese." Moreover, her understanding 
of the term "Chinese" matches the rioters' understanding, at least in part. She sees 
"Chinese" as having what the poor lack, and she ranges herself with those who have 
little. The "we"/ pribumi and "they"/"Chinese" divide along a question of wealth 
expressed as a question of race and appearance. For Rahmah, as for most members of 
the "pribumi" or "indigenous" middle class, the word "Chinese" distinguishes Arose so 
designated as rich relative to the comparatively poor pribumi, and this distinction 
continues to be accepted as true even when it doesn't fit Are facts.
"Chinese" as used for certain inhabitants of Indonesia is a racial category, one that 
marks identity through inheritance of physical traits and moral characteristics. It 
supposedly designates those whose ancestors (or sometimes themselves) were bom in 
China. "Chinese" are likely to be bom in Indonesia, not to speak Chinese, and to have 
ancestors who may have intermarried with "pribumi"; they are not likely to have 
Chinese names.12 An inborn quality keeps them "Chinese," or so it is thought; this 
quality is the state of being wealthy, even when they are in fact poor. Rahmah is not 
anti-"Chinese" in her sentiments. But she is confident she is not "Chinese" not only 
because she does not look "Chinese" (many "Chinese" are indistinguishable from 
other Indonesians and some pribumi look "Chinese") but also because she knows she is 
not made of wealtii, whereas "Chinese" are somehow inherentiy so fabricated. Exactly 
the same confusion of appearance and property arose in other pribumi I spoke with 
who were afraid tivat they did, in fact, "look "Chinese," that is, look wealthy, and that 
therefore they might be subject to looting, as though wealth were a physical and 
therefore a racial trait.
But Rahmah also identities herself with the victims of the riot. It is again a question 
of class. She is not rich, but neither are most "Chinese." Certainly the owners of the 
small shops she watched being robbed were not wealthy. But it is not because she is 
realistic about the actual wealth of "Chinese" that she is able to find something in 
common with them. She is not threatened by Aieir wealth because she knows that she 
can guard herself against wanting it. She said of the looters that they were 
"spontaneous" in their actions once given the example of other looters; that, in view of 
their restraint for so long, once it was all "free" (gratis) they could not resist. She grants
12 Chinese from China, I am told, find those called "Chinese" in Indonesia indistinguishable from other 
Indonesians and lacking, therefore, in whatever characteristics make one Chinese according to Chinese. 
"Chinese," then, the term for those so called in Indonesia, is not a matter of inherent characterisitics but, 
particularly given their long history in the archipelago and consequent intermarriage, an aribtrary 
linguistic practice. For this reason I put the term in quotes.
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to the "Chinese" what she grants to herself; the ability to resist the lure of (imagined) 
wealth. This leaves the word "Chinese" or "Cina" in her parlance, ambiguous. They 
are other than she insofar as they are wealthy. They are the same as she insofar as they 
are "human beings," that is, trained, educated, able to resist the immediate availability 
of wealth, real or imagined; both are, in fact, middle class.
Some looters were themselves not much different from her. Here is a letter to a 
columnist in an Islamic magazine which publishes advice to its readers:
On May 14th I nearly joined the looters. Maybe because of the influence of the 
masses, I lifted a twenty-inch television set in an electronics store. As a matter of 
fact, for a long time I wanted to change my television, fourteen-inches [for a 
bigger one]. But suddenly, both hands and feet started to tremble. I thought of 
God. "Ya, Allah, how can I take the responsibility for this?" Then I set the thing 
down again and asked God's forgiveness. Ustadz, is what I did a sin? Can this sin 
be forgiven by asking forgiveness? Do I have to ask forgiveness from the store 
owner? ARH (Bekasi).13
The writer of this letter acknowledges thinking that he too can do what the people 
around him are doing: take goods. He is influenced by their example. But that is not 
enough. He thinks of what it is that he has wanted "for a long time." The writer recalls 
that "for a long time" he wanted a bigger television set; his own is merely "fourteen- 
inches." There in the shop broken open just in front of him he recognizes what he has 
long thought about, a twenty-inch set. There is, here, no question of need, as there is in 
the usual discourse of why looters looted or "the people" acted. It is simply a question 
of finding what he has long awaited. Even were he not poor (there is nothing to say 
that he is, in fact) he would still loot, at least to the extent that he did so on May 14. 
What we see is that Rahman's description implicitly fit the looters, at least if this man is 
typical; they were perhaps in need, but certainly desirous. They had seen what 
"others" had. The others on television were not "Chinese." But magically transported 
by the synapses in operation in times of anti-"Chinese" riots, the television that had 
once been seen, perhaps, on a soap opera, appears now in the possession of "Chinese," 
which means it is available; available with them and not with others.
The widespread statement of the need of the poor conceals the opening of desire as 
it is fostered in the market: on television and, as it were, through the television set. The 
defense against this desire, the ability to keep it in control, is the ability to consume 
moderately. To think of God as one lifts someone else's property, to set their property 
down again, is to put desire in touch with a source of restraint.14 By contrast to say 
"Chinese" as the woman lifting a sack of rice did in defense of her actions is to make 
"Chinese" the mere equivalent of "riches." It is a word that for some at a certain 
moment blotted out other thoughts; but, in the next days as in the previous ones, fell 
back into its everyday sense.
13 "N yaris Berdosa" [Almost Sinned], Panji Masyarakat, July 1,1998, p. 52
14 The restraint here is religious but that is only one of its modes. In this case, the religious expert to whom  
he addressed his letter advised him he need not ask pardon of the Chinese and he need make no further 
religious efforts to be free of sin since, by putting the set down, he had stopped before he had 
transgressed, hi the light of die diverse places Islam took in the riots, it is interesting to see the legalistic
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Something snaps into place in the immediate present, a wish that until then, "for a 
long time," had been realized only by someone else someplace else. We are not sure 
that this man or others "for a long time" wanted what they at least attempted to take. It 
may be that when seeing the television set, in the way of ordinary shoppers in a mall, 
this man looked on something he'd never thought of wanting at all, but, somehow, in 
the moment of seeing it, he thought he'd always wanted and even needed it. Viewed in 
the soap operas, on tv, the twenty-inch television set is a theatrical prop rather than 
private property. In the context of the riot, the twenty-inch set stood out amongst the 
goods visible through the open facade of a shop. It was—according to his testimony— 
his wish about to come true. The abrupt realization that he could have his wish comes 
with the word "Cina." The word was the means by which an element of scenery 
changed its setting, moving out of the theater but not out of a theatrical or imaginary 
realm. Its new setting was "Chinese" meaning at that instant: "what I have been 
wishing for," "wealth" and "here waiting for me."
It is quite likely that the woman carrying off the sack of rice buys her daily rice 
from the same merchant. She is likely also to have had cordial relations with him and 
to have such again in the future when her present supply of rice runs out. What 
distinguishes her from Rahmah and the middle-class people who refuse to loot is not 
only respect for property or its lack. It is her inability to put the word "Cina"—"Chink" 
might be its English equivalent—in its pejorative and magical sense in touch with the 
person with whom they deal daily.
The condition for their thinking is precisely unlike the condition of the trembling 
letter writer. They do not see catastrophe looming before them should they give in to 
what the word "Cina" means: "what I now know I wanted for a long time, which is 
available in front of me at this moment." No disaster threatens. They are not 
transformed in their identity, suddenly becoming criminals or sinners, contaminating 
their sense of being good Indonesians. And the next day or the next month the store 
and its owner will be there again. Catastrophe, they feel, threatens neither them nor 
their victims.
Indonesian culture at present is racist, but Indonesians are not racist in the same 
manner as Europeans. The ease with which Indonesians ward off catastrophe 
distinguishes them from the latter. European racists find the presence of Arabs or Jews 
or Africans or Turks intolerable because, it seems, they embody elements of themselves 
they cannot bear and which threaten disaster. This intolerable other seems constantly 
present; it becomes necessary to expel it or, I should say, "them." Those Indonesians 
bothered by "Chinese" have a different complaint. It is not that "Chinese" should leave 
Indonesia, but that they should become better Indonesians. The current form of this 
says that "Chinese" should introspeksi, that is, meditate on their failure to mix with 
pribumi, meditate on their own intolerance, which takes the form of promoting their 
own kind in their banks and big enterprises over worthy pribumi.15
emphasis on property rather than an ethical response about those of other religions, violence, and so forth 
in this answer. For instance, there is no mention of "Chinese" in his answer.
15 For an example in English of this commonly expressed attitude, see the letter to the editor of the Jakarta 
Post by S. Sastrowardojo of May 30,1998.
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Until Habibie became president, non-Javanese often remarked that only a Javanese 
could be president and that Javanese are favored in the government bureaucracy. 
Indeed, Indonesian firms are sometimes segregated, with certain taxi companies 
employing almost none but Javanese, others no Javanese. Such segregation is not 
thought comparable to the kind of segregation practiced by the "Chinese." When the 
pribumi favor one ethnic group over another this does not raise fears or charges of 
separatism. The same behavior by "Chinese" makes pribumi sometimes feel that 
"Chinese" will not or cannot or do not want to become "true" Indonesians.
Of course, anti-Semites claim Jews are clannish and keep to themselves. But a 
racism that not only levels charges of exclusivism but that claims to want to remedy it 
by inclusion requires another kind of thinking than that we apply to the European 
variety.16 It means that "Chinese" are not in the place of the consolidated, 
insupportable other, constant bearer of all that threatens lethal contamination, 
tolerated at best and then only provisionally. In other words, though they may be 
stolen from, murdered, raped and be the victims of arson from time to time, they are 
not hated. But they remain outside the capacity of many pribum i to accept them 
comfortably and from time to time they snap into the place of the intolerable, this 
intolerable being uncontrollable desire.
There is a relation between class, race, and national identity in Jakarta that keeps 
racism under control, albeit imperfectly. In the stories of the riots, the "Chinese," as I 
have said, are sometimes blamed for starting the riots simply by being who they are in 
Indonesian society. But the real danger in these stories is, indeed, not the "Chinese" at 
all but those who are unable to keep themselves from looting. The anti-"Chinese" riots 
I am familiar with from Java usually begin abruptly and end the same way.17 As they 
go on, they evoke uneasiness in many who are not "Chinese," in part out of fear that 
they themselves will be next should the riots exceed their original targets. It is usually 
at that point that the riots cease. The danger of disorder arising from below, the danger 
of the massa, is greater than that of "Chinese" who are only the lure that attracts the 
massa and sets them on their riotous path. Catastrophe might come from the 
underclass, but the double view of them—as massa, therefore a source of catastrophe 
and as rakyat, the people, part of the nation—keeps catastrophe out of mind most of the 
time.
It is a question of how the relation between the two terms is managed. The 
assumption, as we will see, is that "the people" need to be educated, an idea perhaps 
as old as Indonesian nationalism. It is the job of the government and the enlightened 
class as a whole to do so. In this notion there is already the idea of a "gap." Following 
Benedict Anderson, I believe there was already a fear of the underclass during the 
revolution with the stifling of a social revolution.18 This fear was identified as a "gap" 
(kesenjartgan) between the people and the well-to-do during the New Order when not
16 Further analysis of the assertion that "Chinese" fail to mix with their neighbors can be found in Siegel, 
"Kiblat and the Mediatic Jew ," forthcoming in a volume edited by S. Weber and H. de Vries.
17 On the trajectory of such riots see James T. Siegel, Sob in the New Order: Language and Hierarchy in an 
Indonesian City (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). The riots of Jakarta are unlike those of Solo in 
1980 in that the rioters were not the massa but students. The underlying assumptions about wealth and 
"Chinese" were die same however.
18 B. R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965).
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merely "Chinese" but other Indonesians began to grow wealthier. The use of the word 
"gap" is practically coterminous with the existence of a middle class on a large scale. It 
is usually spoken of as a difference between "Chinese," who are wealthy, and the 
underclass, who are poor. If there is disorder it is in the first place said to be because 
the underclass is tempted by the wealth of "Chinese," as we have seen. The wealth of 
die non-"Chinese" middle class is thus obscured or denied.
The difference between classes can be managed when desire for wealth can be 
controlled. The insistence that "Chinese" are wealthy and therefore we, the rest of the 
middle class, are not, shows the ambiguity of middle-class identifications. They too feel 
the threat of their impulses, and they know as well that from the point of view of the 
underclass they are a target. They need not have a lot to feel vulnerable; they need only 
have somewhere within them the same notion of riches, a notion which, of course, the 
New Order fostered in both official policies of Development and in allowing the 
enormous development of consumerism. To fear the massa is to displace their own 
interior menace.
One recourse is to blame the government for allowing such a gap to develop, 
thereby giving "Chinese" too great a place in the economy, and to hope also that the 
government will keep order. If disruption does occur, there is another source of 
reassurance. Often not long after public disorder, rumors and spieculations about the 
instigators of the events circulate among people, particularly in Jakarta. Always 
someone in die government, particularly in die military, is thought to have provoked 
the actions. The reasons adduced for the riots include allowing the massa to attack 
Chinese as a diversion from political difficulties. But the major effect is to show the 
need for government control. Thus it is widely believed that Suharto, in Egypt on May 
13, ordered the actions of that day and the next in order to demonstrate the need for 
his own sake and perhaps to justify instituting military law. The other person widely 
accused was Suharto's son-in-law, Lt. General Prabowo, who was said either to have 
acted on behalf of Suharto or, in another version, in his own behalf in an attempt to 
gain power. Neither story has been confirmed at the moment I write this. In June, 
however, as I have mentioned, there were many rumors of men with military bearing, 
wearing boots, arriving in trucks on the scene where riots were to take place, then 
summoning the crowd and inciting them to looting. These rumors emerged in the 
press by the end of June and early July.
The educated classes found the question of who exactly ordered the riots to be a 
matter of much interest. The tone of these conversations was likely to be similar no 
matter who engaged in them. The events were shocking. It was a serious matter but at 
the same time, discussion of "who was behind it" generated a degree of satisfaction 
that initially seems inappropriate, given the shocking quality of the events. The general 
conversation in the press about the place of the "Chinese" had the same quality. One 
felt that the writers, shocked though they were, were pleased to be able to deal with a 
matter of such importance. The satisfied tone is not incompatible with an appreciation 
of the brutality of the events. Once the events are thought to have been manipulated by 
high authorities, people understand that, in fact, the situation, no matter how violent, 
is under control. There is no need to fear that the massa are out of control. Furthermore 
to know, if that is the correct verb in this instance, who behind the scenes was 
responsible is to feel connected with that political backstage. The satisfaction comes,
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ultimately, from feeling that one shares in the workings of power. One knows someone 
who knows someone who knows who did it. The assumption, of course, is that those 
in power demonstrate their position by control of those otherwise dangerously violent, 
namely, the m assaP
Moving down the social scale, one encounters less interest in and less gossip about 
who did it. But people with whom I spoke still held to the conviction that the events 
were manipulated. Such people may or may not claim that "Chinese" are at fault 
because they refuse to integrate themselves, that "Chinese" are overly concerned with 
money, and so on. But they often say that the riots were a mistake since the result was 
to put more people out of work. In the end, though many such persons told me how 
they were barely managing to earn enough to feed themselves, they showed little 
uneasiness. In their case too, the sense that, ultimately, things were under control even 
if mistakes had been made remained strong—strong enough to assuage fears that the 
economy was out of control and that they would be its victims.19 20
By far the most common opinion was that the events were manipulated, hence 
controlled. The other possibility, that the massa acted "spontaneously," however, could 
also lead to a similar feeling of personal safety, even, as we have seen, for a young 
woman walking home in the midst of looting. The "Chinese" with whom I spoke also 
believed the events to have been manipulated. I met sixteen people who had lost 
everything or nearly everything. Their houses had been looted and sometimes burned. 
Their real estate was worth nothing. In some cases, they had also lost shops and cars. 
They were living with relatives. They were, in fact, internal refugees. Many of these 
people were understandably angry. They were angry, however, not so much with the 
rioters themselves as with the authorities. Some told me of having given large amounts 
of food to people in the neighboring slums to help them through the crisis before the 
rioting. Then, as one said, "Just look what they did." But this person spoke not so 
much in anger as with irony and patience. He pointed to the anti-Chinese slogans 
painted on his house. He certainly was not pleased with them. There were some people 
squatting on the curb a little way off as he spoke. I asked him if they were likely to 
have been amongst the looters. He said he thought so, but he seemed quite neutral. 
Then he went on to tell me something often heard: how when the riots began he and 
others first called the police and then various army officials. No one, however, came to 
help them. They were left to flee with their families and servants to a nearby golf 
course where they were safe. In his view, his impoverished pribumi neighbors were not
19 On the structure of Indonesian political gossip, see "'I W asn't There But...': Gossip and Politics in 
Jakarta," Archipel 46 (1993): 46-59.
20 The same logic governs the question of bringing Suharto to trial. The authoritative exposure of the 
Suharto family wealth in journals such as Forbes, which listed him amongst the richest people in the world, 
convinced people of what they already knew. Most people I spoke with think Suharto is a crook, but the 
sense that, even in the midst of disorder, in fact particularly in the midst of disorder, there is control 
makes them patient. They do not want to risk the disorder they feel would eventuate if there were strong 
calls to bring Suharto to justice. Even Suharto's brutality becomes an asset to him because it indicates his 
strength, determination, and control, which people are not certain has been permanently contained. The 
reluctance, surprising to me, to hang him by his heels, shows his murderous qualities to be a valued part 
of Indonesian political life in the past and perceives it as a menacing force in die present and therefore not 
to be disturbed. This could change as demands to reopen questions of responsibility for the Tandjong 
Priok massacre and the killings in Aceh, in particular, made by Islamic elements, become louder.
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at all admirable. But his anger was largely reserved for the police, the army, and for 
those he was convinced had allowed these people to act. He had no doubt at all that 
the riot was instigated. He felt entitled to government protection (and he had given 
money to the police for that purpose). It was unjust that he had been robbed. He 
worked hard for his money; he got up daily at five o'clock, he returned home from 
work after dark, he worked weekends. He deserved what he had. But his fury was 
reserved not, as I have said, for those who left his house absolutely empty but for the 
authorities who should have stopped them and who were in fact themselves 
responsible for the disorder. They should have acted differently and, he assumed, they 
would act properly at some other time in the future. His anger, in other words, was 
based on an assumption that he had and has a right to protection and that he was not 
only justified in asserting that right but that he would prevail, at least sometimes.
The man just cited was the angriest "Chinese" I met. Others, who had lost as much, 
were certainly perturbed, but less upset. At Pasar Glodok, men who had lost their 
entire businesses told me that their creditors would understand and not demand 
payment for the goods they had on loan. It was understood that later, when die market 
was rebuilt and they reopened their businesses, they would get more goods on credit. 
Their standing protected them. These men also blamed the government for lack of 
protection. Like the others, they too had no doubt that they merited protection, not 
merely on human grounds but because they had been bom in Indonesia, they were 
citizens, they lived honestly. Not to have the protection of the government was 
outrageous. Such an attitude implies that their rights and the possibility of invoking 
them have not evaporated entirely. They too felt a connection to the government; they 
too had their own access to it. They told me that they indeed paid elements in the 
police and the army to ensure they were protected.21 The fact that die people they had 
paid failed to respond when they were needed and summoned increased their anger. 
But at the same time, they knew that they had the right to protection, and they retained 
the expectation that they would be protected again. In the end, one has to say that they 
were exasperated. Some, families with rape victims or members afraid of suffering 
sexual violence indeed left the country. They were like refugees during World War n, 
certain they were the constant target of hatred their lives in unceasing danger, simply 
because of who they were by birth; but most did not feel this way. These "Chinese" 
could make themselves known to political authorities and certainly planned to do so 
again. They too believed it was a good thing for "Chinese" to integrate into the nation 
and the local community and felt that integration was already the overriding reality.
The assumption behind the logic just outlined is that Indonesian society can always 
contain its elements. None of them are by nature a source of irreparable rupture, 
neither "Chinese" nor the underclass. In tius view, society may be composed of groups 
or individuals, each with its own characteristics, but in addition there is a correct way 
to behave, "custom" or adat, right manners, which is common to all and, as the idea has 
evolved out of assumptions originating in the regions, national in its scope and 
definition. No matter who someone is, there is a proper way of speaking that allows 
one to include that person. Social discourse in that sense is perfect; its breakdown can
21 The police sometimes responded. Jakarta is the site of the world's largest vihara (Buddhist monastery). 
Henri Chambert-Loir and I were told that it was filled during die riots by people taking refuge there and 
that it was safe. The local police post had been called and sent men; they were paid for their efforts.
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only come from those who are as yet ignorant of its rules. These people, the rakyat, are 
in the process of development; the educated classes will see to it that they learn; in the 
meantime they will be controlled, one hopes, by those in power. Thus "Chinese," 
though they might offer too tempting a target for those who do not understand how to 
control themselves, are not an inherent threat to national society because those who 
have not yet learned control are controlled by others. The foundation of social order is 
ideas of right behavior applicable to all; in case of their failure, there is governmental 
authority.
I have never heard an Indonesian admit that his or her national society is 
inherently flawed by racism and that certain groups or individuals are intolerable. The 
experience of the former Communist political prisoners and their descendants still 
surveyed and discriminated against not withstanding, Indonesians continue to hold on 
to their assumption that all peoples of the nation belong there. In the case of "Chinese" 
this assumption is put into doubt, but not given up. There is an unresolved 
contradiction. On the one hand, proper behavior forbids exclusion; on the other, 
"Chinese" are sometimes improper not by behavior but by identity.
The result is embarrassment. At the beginning of tire New Order, "Cina" (Chinese) 
was a word of contempt which the government forced into use. The respectful term till 
recently rarely heard was "Tionghwa." The embarrassment caused by “Cina" for 
Indonesians is indicated by the series of euphemisms that followed, including "WNI," 
meaning "Indonesian citizen," used only for "Chinese," and most recently "keturumn," 
meaning WNI keturumn Cina, "Indonesian citizens of 'Chinese' descent," as though 
one indicates one's delicacy by pointing to "Chinese" as (also?) citizens or people with 
ancestors. Many "Chinese" are likely to evade the problem by using the English term 
"Chinese," while retaining, for instance, the term "Tiongkok" for "China." These 
linguistic vagaries show that the subject of these terms figures as something 
Indonesians want to turn away from. But there is also linguistic evidence to the 
contrary in the use of "Cina" After decades of use, for some, particularly younger 
people, both Indonesian and "Chinese," the word is no longer pejorative. The necessity 
to include everyone in discourse and long usage have neutralized the term for certain 
people.
There is a more sinister version of the same theme. "Chinese" have a special code 
on their identity cards, thus exposing them even if, as most have, they no longer use 
Chinese names. It is as though assimilation must be denied. The fact is that "Chinese" 
have been assimilated in every way except that they are not fully accepted. The 
embarrassment the terms for "Chinese" evoke is not caused by anything inherent to 
"Chinese" themselves but by the prejudice against them rubbing against the 
Indonesians' characteristic refusal to think that people who behave well can be 
excluded.
Indonesians make trouble for themselves. When they point to the preferred place 
of "Chinese" in colonial times, or charge that not all "Chinese" took part in the 
revolution, as is still sometimes done, or complain about "Chinese" pay-offs of 
government officials, they act in bad faith. Other Indonesian groups also enjoyed 
preferred status under the Dutch and even fought alongside them, yet they are not 
targeted. And probably most Indonesians pay bribes when they find it necessary to get 
official permits. The tendency to associate "Chinese" with wealth, as we have seen, is
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at the heart of Indonesian difficulties. One might argue that in peasant societies there is 
somehow a necessary friction between those who deal in money and those who think 
in other terms. If there is, it applies in societies where money exchange is limited. Life 
in Jakarta, even for its large number of immigrants from the countryside, involves 
money transactions with a range of people, not merely "Chinese." It is not only 
"Chinese" who should be the target if actual money dealings were the cause of 
resentment. Furthermore many non-"Chinese" Indonesians are wealthy. Many are 
traders, some are hugely wealthy, but none have their nationality discounted. Thus to 
point to an historic association of "Chinese" with wealth as the source of prejudice or 
to the character of a society clinging to peasant qualities without asking why such 
prejudice is limited to one segment of the population is to glide over the fact of 
prejudice. This becomes evident when one notices the call for "Chinese" to return from 
abroad after the riots because, amongst other reasons no doubt, their money is needed. 
Or the commonly expressed idea, held even by those who resent "Chinese," that the 
riots were a mistake because the destruction of businesses meant loss of jobs. Real 
wealth gives "Chinese" a place; figurative wealth leads to riots.
One can reasonably say that New Order Indonesia has been invaded by the market 
in many forms and that this has caused difficulties. But the problem is more general. It 
is not commodity exchange as opposed to other forms of circulation that gives rise to 
the difficulty. The assumptions of Indonesian national society are pinched not 
necessarily by their traditionalist residue but by the terms of emancipation from 
tradition and colonialism which guaranteed that modem Indonesian society would 
also always be moral, in contrast to both the backwardness of older prenationalist 
generations and the immorality of Europeans.22 This left no place for the autonomous 
workings of desire, which is to say, no place for the disruptions internal to the person, 
so easily aroused in a society where the market dominates; in other places such 
dislocations are simply expected. Indonesian discrimination springs from the energies 
interior to the nation which it cannot account for and which it attributes to "Chinese." 
Had Indonesian thinking about desire evolved during the New Order, the fears that 
came with heightened desire might have been alleviated. Perhaps anxiety of this sort 
can never be stilled. But it is a grave fault of Indonesian culture and intellectual life 
that it is expressed through violence and prejudice.23
Rape
The balance between racist and assimilationist thinking, the paradoxical 
reassurance or perhaps denial which followed the riots was shaken, however, when 
stories of rape began to circulate a few weeks after the events. Reports first reached the 
"Chinese" community, so far as I can tell, and then spread throughout Jakarta. They 
then emerged in the press; first and most extensively in the English language Jakarta
22 On this topic, see James T. Siegel, A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter-Revolution Today (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1998), and James T. Siegel, Fetish, Recognition, Revolution (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997).
23 On the relation between violence and identity see Hent de Vries and Samuel Weber, eds., Violence, 
Identity and Self-Determination (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), particularly the articles by de 
Vries, Weber, and Derrida.
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Post, and then in the major papers and magazines. These were stories both of rape and 
molestation of women. The second concerned "Chinese" women trying to return 
home, being stopped, dragged out of their cars or off their motorbikes, forced to 
undress in front of a gang of men and ridiculed, but not always raped. Often in these 
stories an older man from the neighborhood or a taxi driver showed up and led the 
woman away. In other stories, which came to predominate, women were gang raped. 
These stories emerged gradually. It also turned out that some women were burned to 
death as their apartments were set afire after they were raped, that some later 
committed suicide, and many fled to Singapore or Australia.
There is no doubt about the depth of feeling these stories evoked. Anti-"Chinese" 
activities have been known since the beginning of the republic and, in fact, before.24 
But anti-"Chinese" sentiment has evolved in recent decades and stories of rape were 
new. In June 1998, these stories evoked genuine outrage and shame in every person 
with whom I spoke, no matter from what class or religion or sex.25 When Indonesians, 
"Chinese" or not, told me the stories, there was invariably a break from whatever we 
had been speaking of earlier. The somewhat pious tone of disapproval in which stories 
of looting were usually told gave way to uncertainty not about the facts but about 
what to say about them or, I felt, how to speak at all.
Press accounts varied in tone. Rarely were these written in the first-person. Most 
were taken from the meetings of the Human Rights Commission at which family 
members testified to the experience of their wives and daughters. Some stories were 
told over the telephone by victims who had fled the country. Many accounts came 
from the victims via the women's groups which counseled them after their terrible 
experiences.
The reports show that the reporters were shaken. Here is an example:
A young woman, call her Joana, twenty-five-years old. The young mother of 
an eight-month-old child never imagined that the place she lived, Cinere, South 
Jakarta, would be the target of rioters, much less that she would be the victim of 
rape by savage humans.
In the blink of an eye her house, neatly arranged and cleaned, was in 
complete disorder. The glass was smashed. Her things were all taken out. Joanna 
and her husband were in a panic [panik]. They screamed for help. Useless. Their 
voices were lost in the tumult of the massa.
24 On the connection between anti-Sinidsm and Indonesian nationalism, see Takashi Shiraishi, "Anti- 
Sinicism in Java's New Order," in Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modem Transformation of 
Southeast Asia and Central Europe, ed. Daniel Chirot and Anthony Reid (Seattle and London: University of 
Washington Press, 1997).
25 By the end of June these stories too were taken up into the discourse of manipulative, therefore 
ultimately reassuring, power. It was said that the rapes too were instigated. In tire meantime, the police 
said that they had no report of rapes; General Wiranto, Minister of Defense and head of tire armed forces, 
was rumored to have told women's groups that the rapes may not have occurred. The Minister for 
Women's Affairs first said she could do nothing since there had been no official reports of rapes; then, 
under pressure from women's groups, she set up a hot line for complaints which, gossip had it, were 
mainly directed against her lack of action. The entanglement of the stories in questions of administration 
did not lead to the abatement of descriptions in the press, however. These reports were in no way 
prurient; they demonstrated the widespread feeling of shame and of identification with the victims of 
these attacks.
Carrying their little one, her husband tried to save himself and looked for a 
safe place. Unfortunately for Joana, she was not allowed to get away. Someone 
grabbed her arm and pulled her out of the room. Joana's husband was not able to 
help. While others were busy looting, someone unknown tried to let loose his 
cruelty by staining Joana. Joana was pushed outside by several people before she 
was raped by one after the other. Her screams of pain went unnoticed.
At that moment the light of Joana's life went out. There is not a drop of 
happiness left in her life. She is in trauma. Shock [in italics and English] has 
flooded her life. . . .  Though the doctor has allowed her to go home, her friends 
still testify that Joana is gloomy and abstracted. Occasionally her face will show 
the depths of her sadness. In fact, she once wept and wept, lamenting her fate. 
Actually Joana is reluctant to see her husband. There are only a few people she 
will see___
For Joana what she experienced is a stain, a shame [aib] which cannot be 
forgiven, but has to be obliterated. So that her descendants after her will not be 
ashamed.
The bitterness Joana is going through is not only the bitterness of Chinese 
women, but of women in general.26
The language of this piece might make the reader of English suspect a certain lack of 
directness of feeling. It is, indeed, the case that not all rape accounts have this tone. The 
use of such language, particularly in a magazine whose reporting is usually far more 
direct and even "hard-hitting," indicates the difficulty of knowing how to speak of 
rape or perhaps of sexuality. Indeed, the only time rape was likely to be reported at all 
before the riots was in the popular newspaper Pos Kota, generally looked down upon 
by the middle class as sensationalist.
To speak of the "light going out from Joana's life," for instance, recalls the language 
of the Malay classics. It indicates respectfulness and the need to have recourse to 
language quite different than the spoken language or the usual lexicon of reporting. To 
begin the description of what happened to her by calling the agent "someone 
unknown" might reproduce what Joana saw as her attacker approached. To continue 
by saying "someone unknown tried to let loose his cruelty by staining Joana" is to veer 
away from the event into a standardized language of euphemism and moral 
condemnation. It is also to apply an Arabic word, aib, (stain) to the "Chinese" woman. 
With rape, a certain universalism applies. But whether it is because the theological 
term comprises all women, Muslim or not, or, because the rapists were Muslim, the 
stain itself becoming a mark of a corrupted Islam, I cannot say.
At the moment of rape the word I have here translated as "savage," biadab, occurs. 
This word moves the account away from the woman's experience into an 
understanding of the place of savagery in a general explanation of Indonesian culture. 
The standard dictionary of Indonesian translates "biadab" this way:
1. belum beradab; not yet polite belum maju kebudayaan; not yet culturally 
developed.
2. tidak tahu adat (sopan santun); kurang ajar; anak itu benar, tidak segan 
mengucupakan kata kata kotor di hadapan umum. Without knowledge of custom
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26" 'Kisah getir amoy-amoy korban perkosaan," Aksi, June 16-22,1998, pp. 4-5.
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(politeness); uneducated; that child really doesn't hesitate at all to say dirty 
words in public.
3. tidak beradab; kejam; pemerkosan anak di bawah umur adalah perbuatan yg biadab. 
Without politeness; cruel; the rape of minor children is savage.
I had no choice in English but to use the word "savage" because it combines the sense 
of "cruel" and "uncivilized." Weak in American, that connection is strongly apparent 
in Indonesian. Not to be courteous, not to know how to behave with manners, means 
also, in Indonesian, to behave "savagely" in the sense that one is not yet civilized and, 
often, that one acts violently and belongs to a different class of beings. The almost 
invariable use of the word biadab to describe rape contains the implication that the 
rapist was savage in these senses. This, indeed, is close to the use of the word "bodoh," 
usually translated as "ignorant," to describe "the people" (rakyat). It is up to the leaders 
and those already cultured to help "the people" become courteous, that is, civilized 
and no longer ignorant, loutish, and unaware of civilized behavior. Such usage is not 
always contemptuous, merely condescending in the older sense of that term.
There is another implication of this word which is contained in the second 
meaning. The television commentator Wimar Witoelar, for instance, said in a written 
article:
I think the biggest tragedy, greater than the ruin of the economy and the 
political disorder is our lack of morals [budi pekerti] as a people who clearly 
allowed savage [impolite, biadab] behavior toward those equally human. The 
issue of rape and looting is much bigger than the obvious fact we have the same 
citizenship and is far removed from the racial friction of the Dutch East Indies 
and Indonesia. How could we act toward other humans in that way? How could 
we allow torture, rape, and murder of other humans?
In part the lack of civilized behavior is a product of corrupt and imbalanced 
political and economic development; in part it comes from the low morals and 
ignorance [kebodohan] of people who still harbor very primitive racial instincts.27
As I have said, the term "biadab" usually modified the word "rape." Looters here are 
biadab because they are first of all rapists. Racism apparently may be excused on 
historical grounds. But the morals of the rapist-looter, according to Wimar Witoelar, 
are inhuman; the issue is one of common humanity. Culture here, the opposite of 
savagery and of impoliteness, is general to humankind. On the other hand, the "w e" is 
not "all humans" but "Indonesians." The culture involved, though it is implied to be 
general, is Indonesian, the national culture. The source of knowledge of proper 
behavior is here national. Its failure appears in the lower-class people who raped and 
also in the upper-class elements of the political class who allowed them to do it. 
"Savagery" is a characteristic of the undeveloped lower classes; the upper classes 
should have fostered their development and thus supervised the eradication of their 
savagery, or, if such has not yet been accomplished, at least kept them in place.
In effect, the writer spells out the assumptions of the word " b iad ab " 
"im polite/savage." In doing so he indicates the connection between the moral 
condition of the rapists and the political class. Wimar Witoelar, known as a critic of
27 "Tragedi yang Jauh Lebih Besar" [A Much Bigger Tradedy], Kontan, June 29,1998, p. 16.
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Suharto, is clearly amongst the majority who thinks that the regime itself was 
responsible for the rapes, at the very least in the general sense of creating the 
conditions for it. Here, however, rather than there being a certain satisfaction in 
naming the upper-class instigator, there is outrage at both the rapists and those who 
allowed them to act. Biadab, as it is used here, at once evokes the brutal lack of 
civilization of the rioters and blames the regime. A reversal in attitudes has taken 
place; those who express their opinions no longer feel reassurance that "w e" are safe 
because violence is controlled by elements of the government, but now fear that "we" 
are endangered because the regime, or elements of it, itself is violent. In the meantime, 
however, Suharto had resigned leaving the question of power ambiguous; at least 
some of those responsible had left office. But people suspected that they were, 
nonetheless, still at work.28
At stake here is not merely who started the riot but the failure of sociality itself in 
important segments of the population, including elements of the government and 
military. The assumption underlying stories about disruption was that violence was 
always possible, but that violence was limited to the lower class or, in the worst case, 
to elements in the government who borrowed their ferocity from elements they then 
control, as happened, for instance, in the murders of presumed criminals in the 1980s.29 
In that instance, Suharto ordered killings without trials, carried out by soldiers in 
mufti. Corpses were distributed on city streets. The government thus appropriated the 
power of criminality for itself. Most Indonesians seemed grateful for the suppression 
of these supposed criminals. In the violence of 1998 in Jakarta, however, the 
government, or at least the army, appears tinged with a criminality which is of no use 
to it. Its orchestrated appearances with crowbars in hand did not aid in keeping order. 
The only understood result was revolt. When Wimar Witoelar uses "w e," he 
generalizes condemnation to the point where "we Indonesians" are culpable and thus 
puts in doubt the very foundation of social behavior.
There is another feature of these stories of rape. The victims were described as 
members of families. It would be possible to tell the stories differently. Reporters who 
described women traveling alone who were stopped on the highway and pulled from 
their cars could have finished their portraits without mention of the victims' husbands, 
fathers, children, and mothers. The feelings of wonder and revulsion the rape stories 
elicited were linked to seeing these victims as daughters and mothers. The paths of 
identification thus led to them and not to their violators.
These stories, told for the first time and told as they were, were impossible or at 
least difficult to recuperate for the usual political purposes. For that to happen,
28 No doubt partly because it is now safe to do so, the press has brought up incidents from the New 
Order's past, such as the killing of rioters in Tandjong Priok, the port of Jakarta in 1984, asking for the 
truth about the numbers killed. It was partly also out of fear that die elements in the armed forces thought 
responsible for the recent riots were still at work even if the same people were not involved. The rioters of 
Tandjong Priok were Muslims, and it is Muslim groups who asked that the case be reopened. It is not 
interest in this case alone which has been revived. See, for example, the cases reported under the title "Saat 
Kita Berterus-terang" [Time to come out with it], D&R, June 27,1998, pp. 15-30 and "Gerakan Politik 
Jenderal Benny, "Panji Masyarakat, June 17,1998, pp. 15-22. As of the time of writing, it is also dear that the 
Habibie regime and some Islamic groups want to deny the rapes, the former to protect whoever was 
responsible and die latter to avoid taking the blame for the massa being Muslim.
29 On this topic, see Siegel, A New Criminal Type in Jakarta.
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disruption has to be thought controlled from above and there has to be confidence in 
such control. But the conditions that would allow the usual cycles of aggression and 
accommodation to take place—so that "Chinese" would become targets, then anti- 
"Chinese" sentiment would evaporate and everyday business would continue without 
much trouble later—did not pertain in the cases of rape. The word used time after time 
was "trauma," from the English, to mean that file effects of rape would not disappear. 
The "stain," (aib) in the old-fashioned Arabic vocabulary used to speak of the act, was 
just that. It was a mark of the massa which would not go away. Stories followed of 
disease, suicide, pregnancy, depression, and broken family lives. Given this new public 
understanding, the reconversion of "massa" into "the people" (rakyat) must become 
more difficult. The notion of rakyat implies its complement, "leaders." When the 
unconscious sliding between massa and rakyat is more difficult, leadership is also put in 
doubt. The idea that later, and not much later, normality will restore itself was thus 
also put in question. The lack of confidence in Habibie, Suharto's successor, was due to 
this as well as many other reasons.
If the rapists were not defined as people controlled from the top, but as 
autonomous actors, then their acts, widely shared in, witnessed, and transmitted from 
mouth to mouth, would be an assertion of the power of the massa, a power used to 
upset basic tenets of behavior. Rape could then be a revolutionary deed whose target 
would be the middle class. The state itself along with middle-class society would be 
threatened. This possibility remains latent. Rape reinflected political discourse, but as 
an element in the call for "reformasi." Indonesia's only successful revolution was anti­
colonial, not civil; the potential for a civil revolution remained inherent in the events of 
May. Whether such a revolt might be incited from the top or not becomes less 
important at this point, since a vision of widespread civil unrest prompts people to 
realize that no one can insure control from the top must always work, and since the 
need to control the massa of course implies that they are always a threat. But in the end, 
the idea that the rapes were instigated by the government meant again that they were 
under control. That control, terrible as it was in its exercise, and even thought to be 
directed against "us," the middle class, was preferable to the "spontaneous" act of the 
savage—and therefore potentially revolutionary—massa. The rakyat has only the aims 
of its leaders; the massa have their own impulses and these can only be feared.
Rape was placed in a political discourse centering on the question of its control but 
with a second dimension, "trauma," which further reinflected political discourse.30 The 
idea of an unforgettable experience with effects which, we will see, transcend those of 
the sufferer, comes with descriptions of victims' experiences (as opposed to mere use 
of the word "rape"). These were rarely written in the first-person since the victims 
cannot or are reluctant to speak. Here is an exception published in a woman's tabloid:
Really I don't want to tell anyone about this shame. Life has no meaning for 
me all the more so since my boyfriend no longer sees me. He seems to be 
disgusted.
30 The word "traum a" in English, or as an English word adopted by Indonesian, was used to describe the 
suffering of die rape victims. 'Traum a" is a fairly new term in Indonesia, used commonly only well after 
die commencement of the New Order. On the introduction and use of this term see Siegel, A New Criminal 
Type in Jakarta, Chapter 4.
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But, okay, I will start this story on the 64*1 floor of my office building at 10:30 
am (Thursday, May 14) when I saw Jakarta thick with smoke.
Many nearby buildings were on fire. I quick got my things together and 
phoned home. My servant told me that in Pluit where I live it was still quiet.
As soon as I got out of the office in the area of M. H. Thamrin [Street; a major 
place of international business], I raced my car north heading for the toll road in 
front of the Metropolitan Police. It turned out there were no toll collectors so I 
didn't pay anything. I kept racing on north and got out at Jembatan Tiga [in one 
of the major older Chinese quarters] because I saw smoke coming from Pluit. I 
turned onto Jl. Bandengan Utara.
But from behind the steering wheel I saw the tttassa hurling things at the 
buildings. The glass was shattered and along the street you could see lots of 
groups of people carrying all sorts of goods. It felt like customers could suddenly 
buy everything cheap.
Without being aware of it all of a sudden my car was near this swarm. Some 
of them saw me and yelled out, "Cina! Get Out!" I was scared to death and 
couldn't drive the car because in front the massa blocked it with wood and metal.
I stopped the car. This massa then threw things at it and struck it with metal 
and wood. The glass in front and back shattered. Feeling really afraid I then got 
out and asked them for mercy.
As soon as I started to move, several people pushed me. Someone took my 
purse with a handphone in it and about Rp. 2,000,000. The massa then got at the 
accessories in the car like the tape recorder, a doll and so on. I said to them, "Take 
it all, but just don't bum the car."
Because I gave an order, someone hit me. Others of the massa did the same. 
Then they took my jacket off. Then a whole lot of them pulled off the rest of my 
clothes.
I was forced to stay on the side [of the road] in front of the car by the massa. 
At the time I was only wearing a bra and underpants. A group of them pulled off 
my red blouse and short blue skirt and the office uniform jacket. I cried and 
asked for mercy but they paid no attention and they savagely attacked me.
Before that, while I was still conscious, several big men pulled me by the legs 
and one after the other they raped me. After that I lost consciousness.
I only regained consciousness when an ambulance came and several 
attendants lifted me up from the side of the street. My body was without clothes 
and covered with paint. I had a chance to see the carcass of the office car. Burned 
and shapeless.
The attendants brought me to the hospital. My body was weak and my 
private parts hurt.
I was cared for for a week in the private hospital on Jl. Pangeran Jayakarta. I 
was really traumatized and even now I see it in front of me.
My boyfriend who knows what happened wept several times. On the day it 
happened he called me several times on the handphone but a man answered. Then 
he hung up. I am sure that the guy was the one who looted my telephone.
I had been going with my boyfriend for six months. We even planned to 
marry next December. Really, and I swear it, up till now I never had any physical 
contact. In the sense that my status [in English] before I was raped was I was still 
a virgin.
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Now I don't ask what my relationship will be. Its clear though that for a 
week, since I have been out of the hospital, my boyfriend hasn't gotten in touch 
with me or come to the house. In the meantime every day I have to take medicine 
and get antibiotic shots because the doctor said there are patients who went 
through what I did and then died of infections of the womb and reproductive 
system.
Fortunately my boss is paying for the medicine. He and his wife are the ones 
who visit me most often in the hospital.
And he is trying not to say anything about this to the other employees. And 
my brothers, afraid to leave the house, send their wives or servants to look after 
me.
In fact I don't want to be interviewed and have it in the paper. What for, what 
good does it do me? Its just one more burden for me. I am ashamed in front of 
people, especially my friends.
I also refused when some people from a Jakarta foundation said they wanted 
to help. Help how? I know, that foundation will get a fee  [English] from the 
donors just as soon as I register with them.
I know that nothing can clear this up. I don't know the ones who did it; there 
were a lot of them. If I go to the authorities even before I make a charge my face 
will be on t.v.
So far as I am concerned, that isn't important. Let the Almighty God act 
against them for what they did. They're religious people, right? They have a God. 
Their God surely didn't want to see this happen. The law of karma will always 
work. Whoever sows the seeds, he will reap the fruit. I know that's the most just 
law.
I still have lots ahead of me. As a girl of twenty-six I still have lots of chances 
to find a better life. But not in this land where I was bom.
After I get well I plan to go to Australia via New Zealand. As someone who is 
wrapped up in the business world, I think that for the next ten years our 
economy won't be stable.
But I love Indonesia, the land of my ancestors [tumpah darah saya]. My mother 
is of Chinese descent but my grandparents were bom and raised in Bengkalis, 
Riau.
You have to put down that I never felt China was my land, all the more so 
since my grandparents were pribumi. Its true we still use ghe [Khek] but only 
sometimes.
In Sungai Pakning, Bengkalis Regency in Riau, our house is surrounded by 
pribumi immigrants. We all know each other and on certain occasions we work 
cooperatively outside the house.31
31 She concludes by saying she understands Riau Malay and has studied Mandarin and English. She 
graduated from high school in 1991, works as a secretary with a salary of Rp. 1.5 million a month and goes 
to university, paid for by her employer, who is in the export-import business. She lives in an apartment 
with a servant. "Sekerang, Pacar Saya pun Merasa Jijik: Jeritan Hati Korban Pelecehan Seks Tragedi 
Jakarta" [Now My Boy Friend Is Revolted: The Cry from the Heart of a Victim of Sexual Humiliation in 
Jakarta], Nyata, June 4,1998, pp. 6-7.
Compared with the video tapes of testimony before the Human Rights Commission, in which the 
facts come out rawly and with unrestrained emotion, without forming much of a story, this newspaper
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Stories such as this one are distinguished from the earlier stories of looting and 
destruction, as I have noted, by being said to be unforgettable and by the irreparability 
of the damage done to the victims and their families. "Chinese" merchants may have 
lost everything including their homes. They or their families may even have died in the 
fires. But few insist that their loss is irreplaceable. It is assumed, as I have said, that 
shortly the world, including "Chinese," will return to its normal state. Rape stories, as 
least as published, seem always to include the word "trauma." As used in other 
Indonesian contexts, sometimes this word simply means "extreme effects." But here, 
while it means that, it also suggests something has been irretrievably lost or 
irreparably wounded which cannot be put out of mind. Loss of woman's honor means 
profound shame. Shame runs so deep that it prevents almost all social intercourse. 
"Actually Joana is reluctant to see her husband. There are only a few people she will 
see." There is not merely a rift between the woman and her violators or between 
"Chinese" and massa. The woman is excluded from her own family. There is nowhere 
to turn to repair her exclusion. What, for instance, could she do if her rapist asked 
forgiveness? And when the government denies or minimizes the rapes and refuses to 
search for their perpetrators justice is not possible. The physical consequences of rape, 
though sometimes severe, are usually said to be nothing compared to the lasting social 
and psychological wounds whose import is estrangement: estrangement from the 
larger society, estrangement of the woman from her own family. The wound is passed
account is already formulated. Shortly after it was published, a story, "Clara" by Seno Gumira Ajidarma, 
was published by the Islamic newspaper Republika (Online edition, June 26,1998) with a similar plot. The 
narrator, however, is a policeman who hears the complaint of a woman telling an experience which 
matches the one in the report above. She tells her story in the first-person, he takes it down, but, he says, "I 
have to be suspicious" to be sure there is not some other purpose to her story. With this justification he 
forces her to describe the rape, even though she sometimes falls unconscious doing so. "I have to know 
what happened after your underpants were ripped off; if you don't say, what will I write in my report?" 
he tells her. She claims she fell unconscious when that happened and he tells her "How then can you 
know that you were gang raped?" and warns her not to spread the word of the rape: "Rape is hard to 
prove. If you are wrong you will be considered to have spread slander." As he writes, he is attracted to the 
woman. He starts his story saying, "Maybe I am a dog. Maybe I am pig—but I wear a uniform. You will 
never know who I really am ." In the end, he implies he has raped her himself. He ends his story saying, 
"Of course I do not need to report to my superiors. Its only to myself that I tell the truth, but taken down 
in notes—all that is secret. So don't tell anyone."
Here one sees the ambiguous reaction that developed in some Islamic groups. Like the government, 
they denied, or at least implied denial, that the rapes took place on the grounds that there is no proof. In 
the case of Republika this is partly in defense of Habibie, partly because the rioters are considered Muslim. 
On the other hand the ambiguous revulsion about rape also, in my opinion, is a cause of the denial. In this 
story, taking the action down in notes, making a record, which is precisely what the police and the 
government refuse to do, is a source of arousal, thus a further excuse for denial. As though, the 
doubtlessly unintended implication goes, were the government to make a record of the events, they, the 
police, would rape some more.
Given the government's attempt to claim there were no rapes and that stories to the contrary are mere 
attempts to discredit Indonesia, one has to be cautious in assuming newspaper accounts are authentic. I 
caution the reader not of course because I am uncertain whether rape occured or not—they did and on a 
wide scale—but because there have been attempts, perhaps by the government, to place false stories in 
order to say that all stories are false. What we have in the case above, it seems to me, is an actual event put 
into a framework suitable for the papers and for the elaboration of stories. In other words, we have the 
beginning of a discourse on rape; what remains doubtful is not the sentiments expressed but the 
possibility that these are not the actual words of the victim. The direction in which this discourse can 
progress and be discredited is shown in the shrewd story published in Republika Online.
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down: her children are infected and so also risk estrangement. Nothing is available to 
cure this wound since its locus is as much in Indonesian society, in its inability to 
reclaim the raped woman. Forgetting, it is said, is impossible. One would have to do 
away with shame itself to allow the violated woman and her children to return to 
society. The cure itself suggests the victory of the biadab, though that is not the only 
possible solution. Hence the national trauma.
The fact that the woman who dared to give the story of her rape to the newspaper 
thinks of emigrating shows the limit of the word "trauma." Her suffering continues 
through the memory of the aggression against her; she cannot live any longer in 
Indonesian society. But she might be able to live somewhere else. This woman assesses 
her chances and the economic prospects of Indonesia. She will emigrate because, as she 
says, she still has "lots ahead" of her. "As a girl of twenty-six I still have lots of chances 
to find a better life." She will find her chances, "But not in this land where I was bom." 
Rape has damaged her, but the damage is irreparable only in Indonesia.
Enough people felt as she did for there to appear advertisements in the Jakarta 
papers for houses in Perth, Australia. Given the absence of a tradition of exile in 
Indonesian culture, one sees how great a modification these riots, and in particular 
these rapes, have made in Indonesian culture. Indonesian national society has been 
shown to be unable to contain its own citizens, both the massa and those it has 
impressed with the mark of itself.
The sense of catastrophe, largely missing in stories of previous anti-"Chinese" riots, 
appears in the stories of rape. We have seen this passage:
For Joana what she experienced is a shame and a stain (aib) which cannot be 
forgiven, but has to be obliterated. So that her descendants after her will not be 
ashamed.
Shame that must be obliterated (but how?) and that nonetheless will not be forgiven is 
a difficult notion. The woman raped will never forgive, therefore never forget, her 
violator. The mark of the violation, the shame itself, which is also a stain, will be 
passed down to her descendants if it is not obliterated. Even when this woman has 
children by her husband, her children will be marked as shameful. Rape in that sense 
harms not only women but threatens legitimacy of descent. Even when her children 
know their parents and can prove they are bom in wedlock, they will be shamed in the 
way of the illegitimate.
This dimension of trauma, the ineradicable stain, disrupting descent, making even 
legitimate descent shameful, returns Indonesia to an earlier era. In the formation of 
Indonesian nationalism, it was thought that modem ways would lead to the formation 
of the nation. Liberated from the constraints of parental traditionalism, Indonesians 
found love (cinta) linking young men and women across the hundreds of different 
ethnicities of the archipelago. This liberation was also a new morality, family centered, 
which by implicit contrast made the old ways immoral. Presidents Sukarno and 
Suharto's fear of being thought illegitimate reflects this effect of the formation of the 
nation. The menace of the ineradicable stain of rape which again refuses legitimacy to 
descent is the eruption of a prenational element, lodged in the fears of national culture. 
The trauma of rape was latent in the disintegration of the rakyat into the massa which 
itself brings a return to a prenationalist state.
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There is yet another element in explaining why the rape of "Chinese" women 
shocked the non-"Chinese" middle class. The "gap" so often referred to between the 
middle class and the massa, leaving the latter at best on the margin of the nation, also 
threatened the identity of those who profited from the county's new wealth. From the 
standpoint of the New Order's theory of Development, wealth should not create 
conflicts of identity. The economic development from which the middle class profited 
and expanded should be thought of as part of national development. But in the context 
of these new events, a context marked by the end of populist policies, a new question 
arises: who is the new member of the Indonesian middle class? Certainly I never heard 
of anyone complaining that owning a new house, a new car, fashionable clothes, was 
in anyway undesirable. Wealth was, at least consciously, thought to enhance those 
who possessed it. And yet, if one looks, for instance, at the photographs in magazines, 
and perhaps especially women's magazines where fashion is the subject, one sees how 
a problem developed. On the one hand, fashionable clothes are also considered correct, 
continuing a long-held assumption in Indonesian culture which stressed the propriety 
of expensive dress. The person of wealth was entitled to it because wealth had the 
ability to create propriety; this idea runs contrary to the prejudiced notions implicating 
"Chinese" wealth. This propriety in the days of the development of Indonesian 
nationalism in the 1920s and 1930s was nationalist. One sees pictures of young 
Indonesian men, either in Holland or in the Indies, dressed in suits and ties. Dress 
itself, which was costly, distinguished them from the traditionalist world. To dress up 
was to enter a world governed by nationalist assumptions. To put on a suit and tie was 
to dream of Indonesia. Now, of course, though dress is still expensive, a suit and tie 
suggests "business" and "bisnis," the Indonesian version, has a shady reputation.
There are other scenarios implicit in the photographs of women's fashions. Once 
again, fashionable dress means propriety; it means an enviable domestic life. But there 
is also the murkier implication of sexuality always inherent in women's fashion. So 
long as this meant "love" in the Indonesian sense, "cinta," in which desire always led 
to marriage, there is no difficulty. But in the climate of the raising of desire in the 
market, the incessant gossip about the mistresses of important men, the scandals about 
"Ecstasy," discotheques, expensive hotels and so on, this is not an assumption easy to 
hold on to.
If one looks at Indonesian fashion photographs, like fashion photography in other 
places, it often lacks background. One cannot tell where the beautifully dressed 
woman is to be found. The setting is, finally, the camera or the film itself. This removal 
from the social scene that goes with proper dress, the implication that fancy dress is 
not only improper but also places the wearer elsewhere—with that place unspecified— 
suggests another dimension to the "gap" of Indonesian society created by the unequal 
distribution of wealth. It is not only the massa who are placed on the edge of the nation, 
it is also the middle class. Wealth, instead of establishing social place, leads to an 
indistinct fantasy of affluence, the mirror of the imaginary wealth of "Chinese" in the 
minds of looters.
If one asks why it is that the non-"Chinese" middle class was shocked by the rapes 
of "Chinese" women, why they, men and women, seemed to imagine themselves in 
the position of these victims, one might guess that, already fearing the massa, they 
imagined themselves as having something shameful and desirable and improper.
102 James T. Siegel
Unable to lean on the weakened notion of Development, the national unconscious 
found wealth to be as shameful and as coveted as it was an instrument of propriety. 
This facilitated their identification with "Chinese." Their uncertainty of ownership, of 
having the right to what they possessed, and the wish to protect it against the massa 
completed that identification.
The M assa Again
No one thinks of himself or herself as part of the massa. It is a category created by 
the middle class, the projection of their own shamelessness onto the underclass, added 
to the fear of losing what they have. The massa are only realized when the middle class 
finds its fears about to come true. Here is an anecdote from everyday life. I rode once 
in the car of a middle-level bureaucrat, a conscientious man mindful of the plight of 
the poor and a pious Muslim. This man was driven to work in his own car each day. 
We had a flat tire. As usual in Jakarta several people appeared to fix it for us. Because 
of the anxiety he showed when he had to step out of the closed, air-conditioned car, I 
could not tell whether he was paying for a service or paying for protection when he 
took out his money. Inasmuch as it was the latter, these men off the street were 
candidates for the massa and not part of the people. My friend, I am sure, could not tell 
himself. When violence breaks out, however, there is no doubt.
The massa embody the projections of middle-class fears. They are activated at 
certain moments. Had there been even the suggestion of a menace when my friend had 
a flat tire, the men off the street would have been bad types, but they would not yet 
constitute the massa since the massa are always numerous. The massa in May 1998 was 
formed, if one can believe the accounts one hears, from above. Local men and boys had 
to be instructed to break into shops and they had to be taught how to rape. Later, after 
the major incidents were over, the following document was distributed in various 
Indonesian cities and over the internet. Though it dates from after the events, it gives 
us an idea of how the riots might have been incited. It takes the form of an official 
document, one emanating from an organization:
Return of Ancestral Goods Stolen by Various Chinese
Goals:
1. Enjoy this life
a. Visit the places of your friends and relatives
b. Do whatever you have wanted to do (which you have not yet
done)
c. Ask pardon of PRIBUMI [non-"Chinese" Indonesians] you
have injured.
Plans:
2. We have already decided that within a short time we will take back
OUR ANCESTRAL WEALTH, by these means:
a. Burning Chinese HOUSES and WEALTH
b. Cutting off men's PENISES
c. Stripping naked men and women
d. Raping Chinese GIRLS
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Desirable:
Making Chinese males our chauffeurs 
Making Chinese women our servants
There is no other way to wipe out Chinese ARROGANCE, so long as [your] 
WEALTH and lives still exist, it cannot be done, [therefore] we have planned 
this as carefully as possible and now wait for the right moment [to carry it out]. 
We wish you peace in using well what life remains to you.
NB: Photocopy this for other Chinese
For Miss Pretty Chinese we will use a curtain rod as a LAMP WICK (we do not 
want to dirty our own goods).
Respectfully,
Pribumi Fighters
This document is widely called false. It is not believed to be the product of an 
organization called "Freedom Fighters" at all but rather to have been disseminated by 
elements from the army, perhaps the same elements thought to have been responsible 
for the riots of May. In any case, it displays some of the same structure of those riots. 
The document, distributed to "Chinese," is also in the hands of members of the 
underclass. It is not, however, likely to have been conceived by the latter. If, after 
seeing this document, they find it congenial, it is because the makers say what they, the 
recipients, think. But, one remembers, rape is new on the political scene and an 
invention, probably, of the army. The idea comes from somewhere else; the agreement 
of some of the underclass is not an accord between what they knew and wanted before 
May 13,1998. Nonetheless, hearing what the document says, it comes to speak for 
certain of the underclass. It is not in the first place a representation of their wishes; only 
after the fact does it say what they want and what they think. It is similar to the 
workings of desire in the modem market. In the shopping mall, one finds things one 
never thought of before. But seeing them, somehow one knows that one has always 
wanted this particular jacket, that particular cap; one even feels one has needed them 
for a long time. If this is the way the events of May were stirred up, it means that the 
massa, in May 1998, materialized when someone spoke for it. First came a voice, the 
voice of a man in boots who descended from a buck, and then came a mass of people 
who learned that he said what they wanted to do. This incoherent group of people 
became the massa. When the booted man left, or when the massa were told the event 
was over, the massa disappeared, to be replaced with the inhabitants of the area who 
wanted "Chinese" to reopen their shops.
The goods taken from "Chinese" will be burned, not appropriated by looters. The 
enjoyment of wealth is postponed until society is restored through a reversal of 
conditions, "Chinese" being reduced to servants, pribumi becoming masters. This 
reversal is the conclusion of the banishment of desire in the present. If "w e" want 
wealth back it is not in order to become wealthy, but to cease being bothered by what 
others have. When we have back what is rightfully ours, we can stop wanting; which is 
to say, we can get rid of desire itself. The good society will come into existence when
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desire is banished. At that point, the weaknesses of both national identity and kinship 
identity will be rectified.
Wealth in this document takes the form "our" goods in the possession of "Chinese" 
("we will take back OUR ANCESTRAL WEALTH"); and wealth here is ancestral, the 
ancestors being "ours," not theirs. There is a double implication here. It may be that the 
"ancestors" are "Indonesians" as a whole or as type, and that national wealth has been 
stolen. Indeed, this charge is sometimes made against "Chinese." But the charge is 
usually made without the word indicating "ancestral." By adding that word, one 
implies that transmission through descent has been somehow perverted; what should 
have been passed down has taken a devious path and fallen into the hands of 
"Chinese." The strange recourse against "Chinese," castration and rape, makes descent 
impossible for them. "Chinese," I have noted, are often called "keturunan," 
"descendants," short for "of 'Chinese' descent," as though only "Chinese" had 
ancestors. Rape and castration suggest that in the thinking of these rioters-to-be, the 
end of descent for "Chinese" is the rectification of descent for pribumi.
Indonesia, in the conception of its founders, was based on its power to absorb the 
different ethnic groups of the archipelago and in so doing to form a new, single 
national identity. This power was fundamental to the formation of a unified nation. 
When "Chinese" are accused of being "arrogant," as they frequently are by their 
enemies, it means that they do not consort with "us," other Indonesians, whereas they 
ought to. They are blamed for refusing to do so, but one could just as well see in the 
accusation the implication of the failure of the power of the nation to assimilate its 
peoples. In its place, another hierarchy is set up, one where "we" are the drivers and 
the domestic servants of "Chinese." It is "Chinese" in this view, and not the Indonesian 
nation, who have the ability to relate people to one another.
They do so, it is charged, in an unfair manner. They steal "ancestral" goods, which 
are distributed by their rules among themselves. This vision of the "Chinese" as 
thieves is racist, but it is not based on a concept of racial purity; rather its opposite. 
"Chinese" are, in the view of anti-Sinites, not like Jews in the view of anti-Semites: they 
do not threaten genetic contamination. Rather their threat is that of the power to build 
a structure within the nation that exists by its own energies and has its own 
regulations. In the absence of the ability of Indonesia to absorb "Chinese," they, 
"Chinese," pull those who might form part of the massa into another structure, rather 
as though they had built a foreign state inside Indonesia. Rape, arson, looting at once 
destroy "Chinese" power and restore it to those who had lost it.32
Finally, we have this observation about the massa. They are thought to be Islamic. 
As Benedict Anderson pointed out to me, when the Christian Batak riot, they are not 
thought of as massa but as "Batak," defined by their ethnicity and not by their religion. 
The massa are a category of the nation and not of the regions. As a transformation of
32 If the events of May had not occurred, it would be difficult to take this document seriously, not so much 
for what it says, as for the strange form of its expression. Its offical format and its impoverished prose does 
not lead one to feel the wish of someone to say something. But the whole of the events of May were 
expressed in a nonserious prose, from the commercial rhetoric naming the scftlens to this throwsheet. The 
seriousness of the event and the lack of seriousness of its languages are not in conflict. The ability to shift 
registers, to treat "Chinese" as valued acquaintances one day and as ogres the next, depends on a certain 
lack of investment in language, one which, nonetheless, leads to grave consequences.
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"the people/' they have much in common with Indonesians of the class above them. As 
should be apparent by now, the Indonesian middle class feels remiss about ignoring 
them because it partially identifies with them and fears them at the same time. In the 
minds of the middle class, the underclass is savage but it is also Islamic. The massa, 
biadab as they are, embody the potential subjects of a religious reformation in which 
rationality guided by religion learns to constrain cravings, wishes, and erotic energy.33 34
Such views were incompatible with consumerist New Order Indonesia during its 
prosperity and no doubt produced guilt at the moment of the economic crisis. The 
middle class cannot afford these ideas, but has never revised them. The violence of 
May 1998 constituted a perverse return of such religious thinking against those who 
believe. The Islam of the massa reflects the beliefs of the middle class about itself, 
showing it its own possibilities, while at the same time aggravating its guilt for having 
neglected the rakyat.3*
The use of Islamic rhetoric and the attribution of Islam to the rioters, as when, for 
instance,"Allahu Akbar" was written on buildings in Arabic script to save them from 
destruction and or when the Arabic word aib was used to describe the stain of rape, 
indicate a projection of Islam onto the massa. At the same time, almost every important 
Muslim leader on the national scene condemned the riots even though some are not 
known for friendliness toward "Chinese." One cannot see these riots as led by the 
figures of national Islam. Indeed, the difficulty for many is, as I have said, that they 
were not led at all or that they were, even worse, misled. It seems to me an implicit 
assumption of much of the discussion of the riots that the lack of Islamic leadership 
aggravated the expression of unmediated desire.
The massa, a transformation or perhaps a remnant of the rakyat, are the product of 
the imagination of the middle class; they are the menace left once the body of the 
nation has divided in two and identity in both its forms, national and kinship, is 
drought uncertain. It remains only to bring the massa into existence. With the collapse 
of credit not merely in the economy but in the government, certain elements not from 
the underclass did bring the massa into existence. The result was rapid swerves in the 
sympathies and identifications of the middle class: with the looters and against them, 
sometimes against "Chinese" but now with "Chinese" women and against rapists, 
once with the government and now against it. All these motions are predicated on a 
fear of the revolutionary tendencies of the underclass, a fear cultivated by the 
government in different forms during the New Order: fear of Communism, fear of 
criminality, and fear of the massa. Now, only apparentiy paradoxically, the latest form 
of tins fear is the government itself.
33 See my The Rope of God (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969) for an explication of Islamic ideas 
of desire.
34 Here one can note the response to the rapes by the segment of the Islamic community that refused to 
condemn the riots. Rapes, in their view, have not been proven to have taken place. The issue of rape is an 
attempt to blame Muslims. For them the rivalry between "Chinese" employers and Muslims is central: 
"Really, pity the poor Islamic community. So many facts about Muslim domestic servants raped by non- 
pribumi bosses and it's as though they are wiped out by the cases of rape from the middle of last May 
whose proof is not yet clear." One notes that the rape of domestic servants was not charged merely against 
"Chinese." Nuha, "Kecerobohan Majalah 'Jakarta-Jakarta'" [The Indecencies of the Magazine Jakarta- 
Jakarta], Media Dakwah, August 1998, p. 14.
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Many Indonesians seem to feel that poverty is shameful and that the remedy for 
poverty is wealth.35 At the same time, many of the same people feel that "Chinese," 
even poor ones, are inherently and shamefully wealthy. The doubt cast on descent and 
therefore on morality as such by wealth and by poverty were manageable when 
everyone was doing better economically. Such contradictions are perhaps common in 
every culture and do not matter except in times of crisis. The Indonesian nation during 
the New Order (I do not speak of its victims) could afford a racism which was only 
intermittently violent, one which gave a privileged place in the economy to certain 
"Chinese" but kept all of them out of public office and governmental bureaucracy as 
though they were shameful, and allowed them occasionally to be die victims of riots. 
There was an oscillation between shameful wealth (theirs) and wealth which covered 
shame (ours) that was tolerated even, perhaps, by some of its victims. Racism, though 
it originated well before the New Order, was a component of its chief policy, 
Development. But when the economic crisis, the "krismon," arrived, the balance of 
political and economic life was lost.
When the world economy affected the nation most immediately, not merely the 
workings of the national economy, but the very notions of ownership and circulation 
were placed in doubt. Rape means that one's most precious possessions are not one's 
own. To "own" becomes a dubious idea when there are people who can take anything. 
They caused irreparable loss, and not only to those raped, as the values of adab— 
culture, politeness—which Indonesians relied on to keep things to themselves 
depreciated with the rupiah. Not only commodities but the most valuable private 
possessions shamelessly whirled into circulation.
It took rape to make clear that the violence inherent in the Indonesian political 
system was permanently harmful and that notions of culture and shame could not 
limit violence, the latter now as much a property of the political class as of the massa. 
The relations of wealth and shame are scarcely new to Indonesian culture. The 
economic modernization of the New Order, the invasion of the market, assumed them 
but left them little chance to develop in a manner that would safely accommodate the 
desires raised in a society of consumers. The events of May revealed their inadequacy 
in the face of economic crisis.
"Chinese," I have said, was a word that permitted massive theft. But Indonesians 
assumed there would be limit to such activities. Once the word "Chinese" permitted 
rape, the limits of Indonesian racism were surpassed. Rape threatened legitimate 
descent and the founding myths of Indonesia. It showed that the savagery out of 
which the nation arose could always return. The evolution of the nation was proven to 
have been driven by the pressure of a growing economy unmatched by concomitant 
cultural evolution. A culture of the market had developed rapidly. Desire was 
generalized while little was devoted to its mediation. One can ask, does the New Order 
have cultural achievements? None that were not banned and few even of those. A 
nation that relied on shame rather than sublimation to brake desire, to extend and 
transform it, and that conceived of sexuality in premodem form left itself open to the 
events of May.
35 On this topic see Siegel, A New Criminal Type in Jakarta.
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I admire the Indonesian women and men who are so bravely insisting that rape be 
made a public issue, its perpetrators punished, its victims understood, and that women 
be granted security. But it remains to be seen whether the continuing fear of the 
underclass and the impoverished cultural legacy of the New Order offers room for the 
important changes in the lives of women and men and for the true democratization 
Indonesia so painfully needs to prevent rape from being a permanent addition to the 
savage habits of Indonesian political life.36
APPENDIX
I do not want to underestimate the strength of feeling of "Chinese" who were so 
savagely attacked. Here are excerpts from one of the strongest statements of a 
merchant. It appeared in the weekly newsmagazine Forum seven weeks after the 
events. It was made by Hadi Wijaya, 47, owner of the optical store "Sinar" on the 
second story of the Glodok market as well as a second shop:
At the time of the crisis [krisis; meaning the economic crisis] I gave basic 
goods [sembako] to the poor. But now it's me that gets donations of basic goods 
from the vihara. That's die fate of my family since these riots.
Now, where the shop which used to be so busy was there is nothing but the 
stench of smoke and stifling, stinging ashes. The passageways are deep in 
darkness. In the comers the only thing to see are pellets of debris which used to 
be merchandise. There are sacks of the remains of contact lenses, all ruined, and 
contact lens bottles heaped up in what used to be a kiosk.
What can I say to my three children who are nearly adult now about this 
tragedy [tragedi]? Thirty years of work gone in a day. I never felt exclusive 
[eksklusif] and better than others. That I worked hard and got to be what I am 
today is only the result of never ending struggle. From the time I was ten I was 
selling on the street comers. Often enough I was picked up by the police, beaten, 
and lifted into a truck [to be brought to jail for selling without a license, 
presumably]. Even while selling on the street, I kept going to school till I had 
finished junior high school. I mixed with the other street sellers who were mainly 
pribumi.
"I began with nothing," Hadi Wijaya said, and then gave his mercantile history; how 
he cleaned other people's stores, saved his money till he had some capital, traded 
dishes, then recordings, and finally opened two optical stores.
36 Perhaps I should point out that what I have written above concerns only Jakarta. What happens next 
depends not only on Jakarta and the other great cities of the country, but what will occur as well in the 
provinces and the countryside. There is no space here for me to take up the question of how fear of the 
underclass is related, historically, to die idea of the emancipated Indonesian woman as a (mere) household 
manager. See Siegel, Fetish, Recognition, Revolution.
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How is it my business prospered? Its because I really worked. Not only that, I 
didn't fool around. Once in a while, a friend would say we should go somewhere 
but I always refused. It's better to save your money. Even eating, I always ate at 
home. With what I saved I opened an optical store in the shop house near where 
we live in Taman Harapan Indah. It's run by my brother-in-law.
At the time of the riots the thirteenth and fourteenth of May, both optical 
shops which took me decades to build were gone in a second. Our store in 
Harapan Indah was smashed and looted on the thirteenth of May. I saw with my 
own eyes, with my wife and children, how the massa smashed and ruined all our 
wealth. My child who is now at the university can't even get up from seeing this 
brutal, brutal looting. . .
At the time of the events, I tried not to weep in front of my wife and kids. But 
after I sent them off to the house of my relatives in Angke, I wept till I had no 
more tears. Speaking of being afraid, we are still in the grip of fear. It's true, in 
the day time we dare to go out, but as soon as it gets dark, no one thinks of 
leaving the house. Trauma [English] isn't easy to get rid of. And what's more, the 
government still hasn't guaranteed our security, us the descendants [keturunan, 
meaning descendant and used now to mean "of Chinese descent"]37
Stories collected from Chinese men tend to have the same elements. They are 
stories about the injustice of the events. About the victims' entitlement to their 
possessions because they worked hard for them. Stories too about helping the poor 
who then robbed them and, not to be slighted, stories of the brutality of the rioters. 
There is sometimes too, as in this moving example, the pathos of having lost so much 
and of feeling oneself a victim in front of one's children and one's wife. The sense of 
personal diminishment is matched by anger at the government for its lack of protection 
and, as in this example, for not, even weeks later, promising to guarantee the victims' 
safety. This man is angry; the government should listen. He has, then, recuperated 
himself, and he expects that eventually he will be heard by, amongst others, "the 
government." The story moves from one of loss and humiliation to anger and to 
possible connection with the government. It ends on a tone of reassurance as it gives 
the foundation for the rebuilding of his life.
Among other effects, these stories lead to questions of the position of the Chinese, 
widely discussed in the press, and questions also of "Reform," "Reformasi," the slogan 
under which the change of regime was carried out. These stories, in other words, lead 
to discourses already in place. The voices of those looted are recorded and the 
expectation is that readers hear them. Discourse, if it was broken, is restored, aiding in 
the rebuilding of assurance.
I want to thank Budi Susanto, Henri Chambert-Loir, Benny Subianto, Rudolf 
Mrdzek, Joshua Barker, Arndt Graf, and most especially B. R. O'G. Anderson for their 
comments on this piece and their contributions of material. I am responsible for the 
errors and they are responsible for much the reader finds accurate and well conceived.
Ithaca, New York, October 25,1998
37 "Suara Hati: Kucuran Keringat Yang Mengering Sekejap" [Stories from the Heart: Torrents of Sweat 
Which Dried Up in a Flash], Forum Keadilan, July 13,1998, p. 44.
